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Supreme Court Review
CRIMINAL LAW
Batary v. Attorney-General for Saskatchewan, [1965] S.C.R. 465.
CRIMINAL LAW - CORONER'S INQUEST - EXAMNATION OF PERSON
CHARGED WITH MURDER AT INQUEST INTO THE DEATH IN QUESTION-
WHETHER COMPELLABLE WITNESS.
Is a person charged with murder required to attend and give
evidence at an inquest into the death of his alleged victim? Forty-five
years ago the Ontario Court of Appeal decided that he was.1 In Batary
v. The Attorney-General for Saskatchewan2 the majority of the Court3
overruled the Ontario decision and held that an accused is not a
compellable witness at such proceedings.
Batary and eight other men were each separately charged with
the non-capital murder of Allan Thomas who died in Gaslyn, Sas-
katchewan on May 12, 1963. Immediately following the death of
Thomas, the coroner called an inquest but it was closed and the jury
discharged, as required by the terms of section 8a of the Coroners
Act,4 when the charges of murder were laid. On May 18, 1963, all
the accused were released on bail and the preliminary hearing of the
charges against them were set for June 12. As a result of an order
made by the Attorney-General pursuant to section 8a of the Coroners
Act, the inquest was re-opened on June 12, 1963, and on the same
day the preliminary hearings were adjourned until after the con-
clusion of the inquest.
After a number of witnesses had been called and examined, coun-
sel for the Attorney General announced that he intended to call Batary
and each of the other accused to take the stand, whereupon their
counsel objected. After hearing argument the coroner ruled that in
view of the provisions of the Coroners Act he had no choice but to
compel Batary and the other eight men charged with the murder to
testify, but that they would be afforded the protection of both the
Canada and Saskatchewan Evidence Acts. At the request of counsel
for the appellant the coroner then adjourned the inquest sine die,
and an application for prohibition was made before Bence C.J.Q.B.5
Counsel argued that the Attorney-General was using the inquest as
a device to obtain information to support the charges of murder
against the nine men and that the compulsory examination of the
accused would deprive him of the protection he now has of not being
a compellable witness at his trial.
In dismissing the application, the learned Chief Justice relied
on the leading case of Rex v. Barnes,6 in which the Court of Appeal
1 Rex Tv. Barnes (1921), 36 C.C.C. 40, 49 O.L.R. 374, 61 D.L.R. 623.
2 [1965] S.C.R. 465, 51 W.W.R. 449, 52 D.L.R. (2d) 125.
3 Taschereau C.J., Cartwright, Martland, Judson, Ritchie and Spence JJ.;
Fauteux J. dissenting.
4 R.S.S. 1953, c. 106, as amended by 1960, c. 14. Infra, footnote 28.
s Sub nom., R. v. Nunn, Ex parte Batary, [1963] 3 C.C.C. 312, 44 W.W.R.
473, 41 D.L.R. (2d) 444, 41 C.R. 337.
6 Supra, footnote 1.
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for Ontario, held that an accused charged with manslaughter was a
compellable witness at an inquest held to inquire into the victim's
death.7 Bence C.J.Q.B. found that the Coroners Act clearly requires
that the accused give evidence, and the Canada Evidence Act8 stipu-
lates that he shall not be excused.
The Court of Appeal for Saskatchewan unanimously dismissed
the appeal.9 In a brief judgment, it affirmed the reasoning of Bence
C.J.Q.B. and rejected the argument put forward for the first time
at the appellate level, that the relevant sections of the Coroners Act
were ultra vires of the provincial legislature.
The judgment of the majority of the Supreme Court, delivered
by Cartwright J., considered first what the position of the appellant
would be when called to take the witness stand, apart from the pro-
visions of the Coroners Act. The learned Justice reasoned that the
criminal law-in force in Saskatchewan is that of England as it existed
in 1870, except as altered by the Criminal Code or other federal
statute. At that time a person accused of crime and the spouse of
such person were incompetent to testify at trial either for or against
the accused. The general policy of the law concerning the examination
of accused persons was as set out in Stephen's History of the Criminal
Law of England (1883),10 where the author points out that the prac-
tice of questioning the prisoner, which had begun to die out following
the Revolution of 1688, was all but eliminated by 1948 after which
time the prisoner was "absolutely protected against all judicial ques-
tioning before or at the trial". The Court was not referred to any case
in which an accused, awaiting trial on a charge of the murder of the
person whose death was under investigation, was compelled to give
evidence at the inquest. Having found no such exception to the rule
as stated by Sir James Stephen, Cartwright J. concluded that under
the law of England in 1870 a person charged with murder or man-
slaughter could not be compelled to testify at such an inquest, and
he would only be compellable now if there had been a clear alteration
in the law to this effect by an Act of the Parliament of Canada.
It was submitted to the Court that the combined effect of sections
2, 4(1) and 5 of the Canada Evidence Act," and sections 448 and
7 Only Meredith C.J.C.P. would have placed any limitation on the right of
the Crown to question such a witness. Infra, p. 322.8 R.S.C. 1952, c. 307.
9 Sub nom. Batary v. Nunn (1964), 46 W.W.R. 331, 42 C.R. 306, [1964)
2 C.C.C. 211.
10 Vol. 1, pp. 440, 441.
11 Supra, footnote 8:
2. This Part applies to all criminal proceedings, and to all civil proceed-
ings and other matters whatsoever respecting which the Parliament of
Canada has jurisdiction in this behalf.
4. (1) Every person charged with an offence, and, except as in this sec-
tion otherwise provided, the wife or husband, as the case may be, of the
person so charged, is a competent witness for the defence, whether the person
so charged is charged solely or jointly with any other person.
5. (1) No witness shall be excused from answering any question upon
the ground that the answer to such question may tend to criminate him, or
[Footnote continued on page 319.]
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488(3) of the Criminal Code12 had altered the law in this way. Cart-
wright J. disagreed with this submission and stated that the effect
of these sections of the Canada Evidence Act, in their present form,
was to give to a person charged with crime the right to be a witness
in his own defence. It was not to enable the prosecution to call him
as a witness. The decision of the majority in Gosselin v. The King"3
which would have rendered the accused and his spouse not merely
competent but compellable, is no longer the law as it was decided
before the Act was amended by 1906, 6 Ed. VII, c. 10, s. 1 by the
insertion of the words "for the defence" after the word "witness".
He continued:
Section 5 does not purport to say who shall or shall not be compelled to
take the witness stand. It deals with the rights and obligations of a
witness who is already on the stand. It does not protect him from the
use against him of the answers he makes in the proceedings in which
he makes them but only in "proceedings thereafter taking place".14
It is true that the verdict of a coroner's jury alleging that the accused
has committed murder or manslaughter
... would not constitute an adjudication that the accused was guilty
but equally the decision of the justice presiding at the preliminary hear-
ing that the accused should be committed for trial is not such an adjudi-
cation. It would be a strange inconsistency if the law which carefully
protects an accused from being compelled to make any statement at a
preliminary inquiry should permit that inquiry to be adjourned in order
that the prosecution be permitted to take the accused before a coroner
and submit him against his will to examination and cross-examination as
to his supposed guilt. In the absence of clear words of an Act of Parlia-
ment or other compelling authority I am unable to agree that that is the
state of the law.15
It is submitted that, although the decision of the majority as to
the applicable law apart from the provisions of the Saskatchewan
Coroners Act is correct, the reasoning of Cartwright J. fails to answer
may tend to establish his liability to a civil proceeding at the instance of the
Crown or of any person.(2) Where with respect to any question a witness objects to answer
upon the ground that his answer may tend to criminate him, or may tend
to establish his liability to a civil proceeding at the instance of the Crown
or of any person, and if but for this Act, or the Act of any provincial legis-
lature, the witness would therefore have been excused from answering such
question, then although the witness is by reason of this Act, or by reason
of such provincial Act, compelled to answer, the answer so given shall not
be used or receivable in evidence against him in any criminal trial, or other
criminal proceeding against him thereafter taking place, other than a prosecu-
tion for perjury in the giving of such evidence.
12 S.C. 1953-54, 2-3 Elizabeth I, c. 51.
448. (1) Where a person is alleged, by a verdict upon a coroner's inquisi-
tion, to have committed murder or manslaughter but he has not been charged
with the offence, the coroner shall(a) direct, by warrant under his hand, that the person be taken into
custody and be conveyed, as soon as possible before a justice, or(b) direct the person to enter into a recognizance before him with or
without sureties, to appear before a justice.(2) Where a corner makes a direction under subsection (1) he shall
transmit to the justice the evidence taken before him in the matter.
(3) . .. No person shall be tried upon a coroner's inquisition.
13 (1903), 33 S.C.R. 255, 7 C.C.C. 139.
14 Supra, footnote 2, at p. 476 (S.C.R.).
'5 Ibid.
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those cogent arguments which proved decisive in the Ontario Courts
in Rex v. Barnes, in the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal, and which
were the basis of the dissenting judgment in the present case.
Fauteux J. maintained that the competency and compellability
of a person to be called as a witness must be determined with reference
to the particular proceeding in which it is proposed to call the person
as a witness and not with reference to some other proceeding. A per-
son charged with a crime and awaiting trial can be compelled to
give evidence in a civil proceeding arising out of the events which
led to the criminal charge against him.16 Where two or more persons
are either jointly or separately indicted and are proceeded against
separately "it is settled law that none is regarded as an accused
person or a party in the trial against the others."1 One of those in-
dicted who is not on trial is a compellable witness for either the
prosecution or the defence at the trail of any of his co-accused. This
rule was fully discussed by the Nova Scotia Supreme Court in Re
Regan18 where it was pointed out that Regan was not
... an accused person in the proceedings against Tanner, and the pro-
visions of the Common Law and statute rendering an accused person on
his trial not compellable as a witness for the prosecution against himself
are therefore not applicable to him.19
Fauteux J. reasoned that these provisions of the law would like-
wise not apply to proceedings at an inquest and he quoted Culliton
C.J.S., in the Court of Appeal with approval:
While a Coroner's Court is a criminal Court of record, it is a court of
inquiry, not of accusation, and the verdict of a coroner's jury does not
bind any person whose conduct may be involved in its findings and does
not, in any way, constitute any adjudication of rights affecting either
person or property. There is no accused and there are no parties....
Notwithstanding that the accused has been charged of an offence arising
out of the death being investigated, he appears at the inquest as a
witness and, as such, is bound by the provisions of s. 5(1) of the Canada
Evidence Act.20
In the light of these statements the learned Justice found himself
forced to conclude:
Subject only to some specific statutory exceptions of which none applies
at a Coroner's inquest, no one-other than a person charged of an offence,
on the occasion and at the time at which he is actually proceeded against
for that offence-is excused from being called to give evidence on the
ground that the answers he might give may tend to incriminate him. If
a co-accused, of which the prosecution is not actually proceeded with,
under the CrlminaZ Code, in the criminal Courts, is a compellable and
competent witness when called to testify in the prosecution of another
co-accused, a fortiori a person, whether charged or not with an offence,
is a compellable and competent witness at a Coroner's inquest where no
one is regarded by law as an accused, at and for the purpose of that
inquest, prior to the very time of its conclusion.2 1
16 Re Ginsberg (1917), 40 O.L.R. 136, 38 D.L.R. 261 (Ont. C.A.).
17 Supra, footnote 2, at p. 481.18 [1939) 2 D.L.R. 135, (1939), 13 M.P.R. 584, 71 C.C.C. 221.
19 Ibid., at p. 598 (M.P.R.), per Graham J.
20 Supra, footnote 9, at p. 335 (W.W.R.).
21 Supra, footnote 2, at p. 489.
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At first reading it is difficult to accept the decision of the
majority; the arguments in the dissenting judgment cannot be ignored.
It is submitted, however, that the conflict between the positions of
Cartwright J. and Fauteux J. is more apparent than real. The judg-
ments seem irreconcilable only because neither discussed the real
issue before the Court. It is undoubtedly true that no person charged
can be compelled to give evidence in criminal proceedings directed
against him, but he can be called to testify at any other civil or
criminal proceeding. The authorities would also support the statement
that a coroner's inquest is an inquiry at which no one is in law an
accused person against whom criminal proceedings are directed.
22
It is suggested that the question which should have been considered
in some detail is whether the proceedings in this case could properly
be defined as an 'inquest'. Is it correct to state that certain proceedings
are not directed against any person so as to give him the status of
a "person accused" merely because those proceedings are held before
a coroner?
The function of a coroner's inquest is to enquire how a human
being came by his death in order to discover whether anyone appears
to be responsible for the events which caused it. If, as a result of this
inquiry, evidence is adduced which would indicate that some person
is criminally responsible for the death under investigation, the jury
may, by their verdict, allege that he committed murder or man-
slaughter. If such a verdict is rendered the coroner is required by
s. 448 of the Criminal Code to compel that person to appear before
a justice. The object of the inquest is to discover facts and to decide
whether those facts will support such an allegation, in order that
the person implicated may be brought before the Courts to answer
to the charge against him. It is the function of the Criminal Courts
then to decide his guilt or innocence with respect to this charge.
In his decision in Rex v. Barnes,23 Orde, J. discussed the difference
between an inquest and proceedings after someone has been charged
in connection with the death in question. There he stated
in view of the fact that an inquest is primarily intended to get early
evidence as to the persons responsible for the death of the deceased,
when as here the authorities have already determined that the evidence
points to Barnes' guilt, and he is formally committed for trial upon the
charge, to endeavour to compel him to give evidence in another proceed-
ing and thereby virtually to examine him for discovery, comes with a
shock to one's sense of fair play, and seems to be a serious inroad upon
the principle that the burden of establishing the guilt of a person charged
with a crime falls upon the Crown. To say that the incriminating answers
cannot be used against the accused upon his trial really begs the question.
The Crown may, by means of this oppressive power, extract evidence
from an accused which, while not admissible in evidence against him
upon his trial, may nevertheless furnish the Crown with certain informa-
tion which might enable the Crown by means of other evidence to con-
vict the accused. Of course, a person suspected of but not yet charged
with the crime is in exactly the same position if called upon to give
evidence before the coroner's jury when afterwards prosecuted for the
22 Wolfe v. Robinson, [1962] O.R. 132,31 D.L.R. (2d) 233.
23 Supra, footnote 1, at p. 45 (C.C.C.), 628 (D.L.R.), 378-9 (O.L.R.).
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offence, but the fact that in the one case, the authorities have already
fixed upon the alleged guilty party, and in the other are merely seeking
to discover him, impresses upon one's mind the lengths to which section 5
may go if resorted to by the Crown.
With respect, it is submitted that the sole function of a coroner's
inquest is to discover the alleged guilty party in order that a charge
may be subsequently laid. Once the authorities become aware that a
crime has been committed, and on a reasonable and probable belief
in his guilt, have charged some person with murder or manslaughter,
no inquest is necessary. If it can be assumed that legal proceedings
are generally conducted to some end, proceedings before a coroner
in such circumstances could only be an effort to obtain evidence for
some reason other than to determine whether an allegation should
be made. The only reasonable conclusion is that the object of such
an inquiry is to elicit evidence to prove the guilt or innocence of the
person charged, and the proceedings then would be in fact a step
in the prosecution of the accused at which he could not be compelled
to testify.
If these arguments are valid then a proper coroner's inquest could
be held after a charge of murder had been laid, only if it were neces-
sary to determine whether any persons other than those accused were
responsible for the death. In Rex v. Barnes, Meredith C.J.C.P. stated:
On principle, therefore, it is not lawful, or proper, to examine the appel-
lant in the coroner's Court in any way regarding the charge which is
pending against him, as long as he is in jeopardy in respect of it. But
he may, in my opinion, be examined as a witness in regard to the guilt
of any other person, so long as the examination does not touch in any
way the charge against him.24
In theory the Supreme Court might have accepted the result reached
by Meredith C.J.P.C.; in fact it decided between the practical
alternatives.
There is no doubt that the coroner's inquest is an effective means
of accumulating information which is necessary for the protection
of society. To enable it to function some individual rights must be
sacrificed to the needs of the state. Its usefulness would be severely
limited if anyone who was implicated in any way in connection with
the death under investigation could refuse to testify. In his judgment
Fauteux J. mentioned that if Batary had been merely a suspect, not
yet charged, he would clearly have been a compellable witness. On
the other hand, the fact that the inquiry conducted by the coroner
should not be unduly restricted, does not justify the use of such
proceedings to achieve an end which should be gained by other means.
The Crown has a duty to ensure "that justice is so administered that
the public confidence in the fairness of its administration may be
maintained unimpaired."26 It must operate within a framework of
24 bid., at p. 51 (C.C.C.), 633 (D.L.R.), 385 (O.L.R.). It might well be
argued that because such proceedings could only be directed toward discover-
ing facts which would establish grounds for an allegation that persons not
yet charged had committed a crime, the guilt or innocence of anyone already
charged would not be relevant.
25 Supra, footnote 2, at p. 480.
26 Supra, footnote 13, at p. 391 (S.C.R.), per Mills J.
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procedural rules devised to strike a just balance between the rights of
the individual and the collective power of the state. The rules may be
changed from time to time as the needs of society change but if the
Crown is to keep the confidence of the public they must not be evaded.
To permit an inquiry before a coroner to be held after its object had
been achieved in order to deprive the accused of a right specifically
reserved to him would be to encourage such an evasion.
The second main problem facing the Supreme Court in this case
was whether Batary was compellable to give evidence before the
coroner's court by reason of the provisions of the Saskatchewan
Coroners Act 27 In the Court of Appeal the appellant had argued that
sections 8a,28 1529 and 20 of the Act are beyond the powers of the
provincial Legislature in that they relate to "Procedure in Criminal
Matters", a subject within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Parliament
of Canada by virtue of section 91(27) of the British North America
Act, 1867.
In deciding this question Chief Justice Culliton adopted the
definition used by Macdonald C.J.A. in In Re Public Inquiries Act 3o
to the effect that "Criminal Matters" are proceedings in the criminal
Courts and "Procedure" means the steps to be taken in prosecutions
or other proceedings in such Courts. Culliton C.J.S. concluded that
the impugned sections of the Coroners Act which purport to regulate
27 Supra, footnote 4.
28 Enacted 1960, c. 14, s. 2.
8a. (1) Where a person has been charged with a criminal offence arising
out of a death, an inquest touching the death shall be held only upon the
direction of the Attorney General.(2) Where during an inquest any person is charged with a criminal
offence arising out of the death, the coroner shall discharge the jury and
close the inquest, and shall then proceed as if he had determined that an
inquest was unnecessary, provided that the Attorney General may direct that
the inquest be reopened.
29 Rep. and sub. 1960, c. 14, s. 3.
15. (1) The coroner and jury shall at the first sitting of the inquest
view the body unless a view has been dispensed with under section 9 and 10,
and the coroner shall examine on oath, touching the death, all persons who
tender their evidence respecting the facts and all persons who in his opinion
are likely to have knowledge of relevant facts.(2) Subject to subsection (3), no person giving evidence at the
inquest shall be excused from answering a question upon the ground that
the answer thereto may tend to criminate him or may tend to establish his
liability to a civil proceeding at the instance of the Crown or of any person
or to a prosecution under any Act of the Legislature, but if he objects to
answering the question upon any such ground he shall be entitled to the
protection afforded by section 5 of the Canada Evidence Act and by section
33 of The Saskatchewan Evidence Act.(3) Before a person gives evidence at the inquest subsection (2) shall
be read to him by the coroner.(4) A person giving evidence at the inquest may be represented by
counsel who may examine and cross-examine witnesses called at the inquest
and may on behalf of his client take the objection mentioned in subsection (2).
20. Counsel appointed by the Attorney General to act for the Crown, at
an inquest may attend thereat and may examine or cross-examine the witness
called, and the coroner shall summon any witness required on behalf of the
Crown.
30 (1919), 48 D.L.R. 237, 3 W.W.R. 115, 27 B.C.R. 361, 33 C.C.C. 119.
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proceedings at an inquest do not relate to steps to be taken in a
prosecution or other criminal proceeding, but rather to the "Adminis-
tration of Justice Within the Province", a provincial matter under
section 92(14) of the British North America Act, 1867.
It will be noticed that this conclusion is in direct conflict with
that of the Ontario Court of Appeal in Wolfe v. Robinson.31 In holding
that no one other than the coroner, the jurors and the Crown Attorney
or counsel representing the Attorney General has any right to cross-
examine witnesses at an inquest,32 Schroeder J. stated, in obiter
dicta, that
The Coroner's Court being a criminal Court of record, only the Parlia-
ment of Canada has authority to enact legislation as to the Rules ofPractice and Procedure to be followed in that forum in accordance with
the provisions of s. 91(27) of the British North America Act .... [Apart
from ss. 448, 488, 648 and 649 of the Criminal Code] . . . there is no otherFederal legislation now in force affecting that office, and Parliamenthas not seen fit to enact nor has it authorized the enactment of Rules
of Practice and Procedure applicable to a Coroner's inquisition. TheProvincial Legislature has not done so and, indeed, if it had the legisla-
tion would be ultra vires of that legislative body.33
The Supreme Court did not decide between these two conflicting
views of the law. Indeed, there was no need for the Court to consider
the nature of proceedings at a coroner's inquest. If proceedings before
a coroner in which some person charged with murder in connection
with the death under investigation, is compelled to give evidence as
to his guilt or innocence cannot properly be termed an inquest, then
the question of the validity of legislation purporting to regulate pro-
ceedings at an inquest is beside the point. In fact, the decision of the
majority of the Supreme Court did not reverse the Court of Appeal
on the ground that the regulatory sections of the Coroners Act were
ultra vires of the provincial legislature.
In this part of the judgment Cartwright J. confined his remarks
to legislation which could be construed as an attempt to require
an accused to take the stand. After comparing the wording of section
15 of the Act with that of the section which was repealed in 1960,
he concluded that the Legislature did intend to render a person
charged with murder compellable to give evidence at the inquest
on the body of his alleged victim. He then stated that any legislation
which purported to force such a person to testify in this way or
... to abrogate or alter the existing rules which protect a person
charged with crime from being compelled to testify against himself, Islegislation in relation to the Criminal Law including the Procedure In
31 Supra, footnote 22. 0
32 The Ontario Coroners Act, R.S.O. 1960, c. 69, has no section similar
to s. 15 of the Saskatchewan Act.
33 Supra, footnote 22, at p. 137. Thus in Ontario, prior to this decision of
the Supreme Court, a person charged with murder was not only a com-pellable witness at the inquest on the body of his alleged victim, but he wasdeprived of the right to examine or cross-examine any other witness. His
counsel had no more rights in the coroner's court than any other member
of the public.
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Criminal Matters and so within the exclusive legislative authority of
the Parliament of Canada under head 27 of s. 91 of the British North
America Aot.3 4
Taken at face value, this conclusion begs the question if the
existing rules only protect a person charged with crime from being
compelled to testify against himself in proceedings directed against
him. If, however, as has been argued above, proceedings before a
coroner at which the person charged with murder is compelled to
give evidence are not an inquiry but a step in the prosecution of the
accused, those proceedings would clearly be procedure in criminal
matters. It is submitted that this premise must be implied in the
judgment, and that the validity of provincial legislation relating to
procedure in a properly constituted coroner's inquest remains ques-
tionable.
The decision in the present case will be welcomed by all who
believe that the Crown should be required to obtain convictions by
proper means. The use of legal procedure to achieve an end other
than that for which it was conceived is an abuse of that procedure.
The role of the coroner's inquest is to inquire, discover and allege
that a crime has been committed. The prosecution of an accused
should be confined to those courts which are concerned with deter-
mining his guilt or innocence.
J. C. E. WOOD%-
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In the recent Ontario case of the Co-Operators Insurance Associa-
tion v. Kearney,' the Supreme Court of Canada took another look
34 Supra, footnote 2, at p. 478. In deciding that the coroner's inquest is a
criminal court the Canadian courts have relied heavily on English authorities.(See the leading case of R. v. Hammond (1899), 29 O.R. 211.) As there are
now a number of significant differences between inquests in England and
Canada, the value of English authorities should be questioned. In England,
for example, a person charged by the verdict of a coroner's court could be
tried without being brought before a justice. Should not the test of determin-
ing whether a procedure falls within the legislative jurisdiction of the Federal
or Provincial Parliaments depend upon the nature of that procedure as it
exists in Canada today? It is submitted that the functional approach adopted
by the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal would produce the most sensible solu-
tion to this problem.
J. C. E. Wood is a first year student at Osgoode Hall Law School.
1 [19631 2 O.R. 1, 38 D.L.R. (2d) 290 (Ont. H.C.); [19641 1 O.R. 101, 41
D.L.R. (2d) 196 (Ont. C.A.) Aff'd; [19651 S.C.R. 106, 48 D.L.R. (2d) 1.
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